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ABSTRACT 
A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and 
modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation.  These Design Information 
Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the 
facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use.  The actual practice of DIV presents 
challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or 
proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the 
safeguards relevant information.  Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of 
reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges.  
This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, 
which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges.  The use of 3D Laser 
Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as 
well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and 
portability for the inspector) were presented.  The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the 
use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, 
using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies that 
countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements, pursuant to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  One of the key provisions in the 
INFCIRC/153 IAEA Model Safeguards Agreement is the requirement for the country to provide 
nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA, relevant to safeguarding the 
facility.[1] This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards relevant features of 
the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed.  The design information 
is initially conveyed from the facility operator through the national authorities (State System of 
Accounting for, and Control of Nuclear Material – SSAC) to the IAEA using the completed Design 
Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and updated as required by written addendum.   Design 
information examination (DIE) of declared information is carried out by IAEA safeguards 
inspectors to design a safeguards approach for each specific facility. IAEA safeguards inspectors 
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 also perform a design information verification (DIV) using this information, together with other 
available information, to confirm that a facility is built and operated as declared.[2] 
 
This report presents the findings from a technical workshop [3] sponsored by the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International 
Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), under the Advanced Safeguards Approaches (ASA-100) 
project, and in support of Institutionalizing Safeguards by Design (ISBD).[4]  This project and 
workshop are also in support of the NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, specifically to 
provide enabling technologies for improving nuclear facility design information verification for 
safeguards.[5]  The NNSA sponsored this technical workshop, involving international nuclear 
safeguards experts within the DOE Complex, as well as foreign safeguards partners in overseas 
organizations, such as the European Joint Research Centre at Ispra, Italy (JRC/Ispra), to address the 
status of the DIE/DIV activity and consider how it could be improved. 
 
The purpose of the workshop was to review how nuclear facility design information is currently 
verified and consider advanced tools and methods that could improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of this activity. The focus was first on reviewing the fundamental safeguards need, 
and secondly to consider appropriate available technology to more efficiently address that need. It 
has been recognized by NNSA and the U.S. DOE National Laboratories that there is a need to more 
effectively and efficiently verify that nuclear facilities are as declared, in support of international 
nuclear safeguards.  
 
CURRENT DIE/DIV SAFEGUARDS NEEDS 
The primary objective of the DIE/DIV activity is to verify, from a nuclear safeguards perspective, 
that the facility is constructed as declared, and has not been changed or modified without notice.  
Specifically, the DIV activity is to verify that the location, purpose, function, size and capacity for 
handling, processing, and storing uranium, plutonium and thorium are as declared.  
 
Consequently, there is a need to verify the: 
1. Name and location of the facility (To confirm declared facility name and location); 
2. External size, dimensions, and manner of facility construction (To confirm the overall size 
and gauge the capacity of the facility); 
3. Size of main process areas and absence of undeclared process space, including basements, 
sub-basements and pipe trenches (To confirm the overall size of the process, estimate the 
process capacity, and inspect for concealed process or interconnected areas); 
4. Size, number, list, and configuration of essential process equipment, vessels and piping (To 
confirm the size and process capacity and to better determine nuclear material flow key 
measurement and other strategic points); 
5. Nuclear material flow path, entries and exits, manner of conveyance or transfer, and 
measurement points (To verify the nuclear material pathway, possible diversion paths, and 
determine flow key measurement and other strategic points); 
6. Nuclear material inventory, hold-up, storage areas, and containment and surveillance 
features (To verify the features for measuring, storing, containing, and surveilling the 
nuclear material inventory, and for determining the inventory key measurement points); 
7. Installed or planned safeguards instruments, for both the operator and inspector (To verify 
that the points or containers measured, and associated safeguards data, will meet the needs 
 for nuclear material accounting for verifying nuclear material inputs, outputs, transfers, 
waste transfers, hold-up, and inventory. This includes an assessment of the 
representativeness of sampling, instrument accuracy, measurement frequency, and data 
collection and transmission security). 
 
According to the IAEA Annual Report for 2007, the IAEA implements safeguards and conducts 
inspections at 949 nuclear facilities, in both non-nuclear weapon and nuclear weapons states.[6] Of 
these, we estimate that approximately 30 are currently under construction or are undergoing start-
up. The facilities that are subject to regular or routine inspection will normally be subject to one 
physical inventory verification (PIV) per year, which is typically when the design information is 
periodically re-verified.  It is also important to note that the total number of facilities is constantly 
growing, and the types of facilities are becoming more complex and strategically important, i.e. 
potentially handling or processing fissile material such as in uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
spent fuel reprocessing, and Pu-MOX fuel fabrication plants.  Consequently, it takes inspectors with 
greater knowledge and experience, with applicable training to perform proper DIE/DIV visits at 
these facilities.  
 
An updated DIQ or addendum to an existing DIQ may require a DIE/DIV visit outside of a 
scheduled PIV. Life cycle phase changes associated with a facility’s pre-construction, construction, 
commissioning, operating, maintenance or modification, shutdown, close-down and 
decommissioning require that inspectors evaluate the change and determine viability of an 
additional visit for verification.  Time expended by an IAEA Safeguards Inspector to review and 
verify a change in life cycle depends largely upon the complexity of the facility and transparency of 
the SSAC to provide essential information in the working language of the IAEA (English).  
 
Worldwide facility design verification is a challenging aspect of IAEA safeguards that demands 
programmatic and technical support from the United States. The number and types of DIE/DIV 
tools available to international nuclear safeguards inspectors are currently limited and need to be 
further expanded to include user friendly and easily transported systems.  
 
CURRENT DIE/DIV PRACTICES 
To verify the above aspects of a facility, the safeguards inspector compares the information in the 
DIQ with what they find during their inspection.  They will look up articles and information on the 
facility and confirm the location and exterior appearance.  At the facility, they will use construction 
tape-measures, laser distance instruments, and Global Positioning Satellite coordinates to verify that 
the buildings match the construction drawings and facility plans provided through the SSAC.  Inside 
the facility the inspector will use the same tools, i.e., tape-measures, laser distance tools, and plant 
drawings, as well as photographs and notes or sketches from previous inspections.  Additionally, the 
IAEA has a limited number of 3-Dimensional Laser Range Finder (3DLR) units (described below) 
that can produce a digital image of the interior of the facility for comparative purposes.  If required, 
a team of inspectors will perform the inspection, to allow the entire facility to be verified.  The 
inspector also must verify the material flow paths, entry/exit points, and the equipment placed at 
key measurement points.  They must take note of hallways, connected piping and ductwork, and 
any changes or alterations to the facility relevant to drawing a conclusion about the safeguards of 
the facility. 
 
 The current DIV activities are very labor intensive and dependent upon the individual experience 
and capabilities of the inspector.  Tools that would assist the inspector in managing the complex 
facility information, improve their ability to extract the safeguards relevant data, and speed up or 
automate the data collection and analysis would greatly improve the DIV capability of the IAEA 
inspectors. 
 
 
MODERN TOOLS FOR DIE/DIV 
Modern tools that would enhance the capability of IAEA inspectors to perform DIV inspections 
were presented at the workshop.  They are described herein. 
 
3-Dimensional Laser Rangefinder [7] 
The 3DLR is a laser-based survey tool that has been adapted for use in facility DIV inspections by 
the safeguards development team at the JRC/Ispra.  A rastered laser beam is rotated to produce a 
spherical emission pattern.  The Doppler shift of the reflected beams allows calculation of distance 
(out to approximately 80 meters), and a 3-D image of the area can thus be produced.  The images 
are processed with software than can detect differences between images that correspond to 
millimeters of displacement within the facility.  Coupled with software that highlights these 
differences, the 3DLR is very useful for drawing an inspector’s attention to changes that warrant 
closer inspection, as illustrated in Fig. 1.  The IAEA currently uses 3DLR in a limited fashion -- 
most notably, there is a 3DLR unit permanently assigned for use at the Rokkashomura Reprocessing 
Plant (RRP) in Japan. 
 
 
Figure 1.  3DLR Automated Change Scene Detection Feature.  The 3DLR 
has been designed to compare two images and highlight the differences.  
[Ref. 7] 
 
Compton Gamma Radiation Imaging [8, 9] 
The image derived from the 3DLR, while of high utility, can only show what is already visible to 
the inspector.  Inspectors also have the need to ensure that there is not hidden piping or diverted 
material in undeclared flow pathways.  Adding a radiation detection component would enhance the 
ability to meet this need.  A Compton Compact Imager (CCI) has been developed that provides an 
image with a high spatial resolution showing the location of radiation sources.  Coupling the CCI 
 with a 3DLR, shown in Fig. 2, allows the location and intensity of radiation sources to be mapped 
over the image of the facility.  The combined system, referred to as Gamma-LIDAR (Light 
Detection and Ranging) has been demonstrated in laboratory conditions by locating a source 
concealed in piping. 
 
Figure 2.  3DLR modified with Compact Compton Imager.  The facility 
image produced by the 3DLR will be merged with radiation intensity 
information to verify material presence and flow pathways.  [Ref. 8] 
 
Enhanced Ground Penetrating Radar 
The workshop team discussed Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) to detect undeclared or concealed 
process equipment, material flow paths, or additional underground structures.  The IAEA has 
limited experience with GPR; primarily in countries that have agreed to implementation of the 
Additional Protocol.  Enhanced models that can produce a 3-D image (as opposed to the planar 
image of earlier models) have become available, and would be of use in the DIV activities to verify 
the location and size of facilities. 
 
Virtual Reality for Facility Models [10] 
One of the most significant challenges an inspector faces when performing DIV is the sheer volume 
and complexity of the information.  They have to take the provided facility diagrams, equipment 
layout, drawings, and photos and notes from previous inspections and understand the material flow 
pathways and other safeguards relevant information.  Projected virtual reality (VR) offers the ability 
to integrate this collection of information into a tool that improves the inspector’s ability to prepare 
for and perform the DIV inspection.  An example, showing a model of the Fuel Conditioning 
Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) (See Fig. 3), was presented at the workshop.  The 
utility of the model for training purposed was demonstrated by a walk through of the VR facility.  
During the walk through of the actual facility the next day, it was apparent that the workshop 
participants recognized features they had seen in the VR model.  Creating a VR model of a facility 
allows the creation of a tool that can contain detailed design information that can be registered to 
the facility location it applies to, allowing training or practice before the inspection and access to the 
information as needed during the DIV. 
  
Figure 3: Image of the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) Virtual Model.  [Ref. 9] 
 
Change Detection System [11] 
A common element of DIV is to compare images of the facility with those from previous 
inspections.  In practice, this often involves photographic prints that the inspector must visually 
(and manually) compare with current photographs.  A Change Detection System (CDS) has been 
developed that can rapidly and effectively compare any two digital images.  The complexity of the 
picture (of, for example, the extensive piping and an enrichment facility) is reduced by software 
alignment to just the differences between the two images.  Scanning old photographs into a digital 
format and using digital cameras to collect future images would allow CDS to be put to use quickly 
and easily to enhance the DIV capability of inspectors. 
 
Robotics [12] 
Advances in robotics and human machine interaction have advanced the ability for robots and 
people to work as members of a team.  The robot can enter areas the person cannot (i.e. high 
radiation fields or contaminated areas), while better control interfaces make it very realistic for non-
experts to improve their performance by using a robot.  Robots have been successfully employed in 
other fields to map areas and carry sensors.  Robots deployed for DIV activities could produce 
facility maps to compare against declarations, both inside and outside the facility. 
 
Outdoor Verification System [13] 
An inspector must also verify the outside of a facility to see if undeclared capacity has been 
constructed and to determine whether nearby buildings are functionally linked.  The JRC/Ispra has 
developed the Overhead Verification System, which operates similarly to the 3DLR, but effective to 
a greater range and designed to be mounted atop a vehicle.  A 3-D image is produced that can give 
the inspector the ability to pan and zoom as needed to perform their DIV inspection. 
 
SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP FINDINGS  
From the panel discussion, the workshop team noted the following major findings: 
1. IAEA inspectors continue to perform DIV using primarily hand-tools, blueprints, and visual 
observation. Modern techniques exist to dramatically improve the DIV activity. 
 2. The 3-Dimensional Laser Range Finder (3DLR), developed by JRC/Ispra and used by the 
IAEA, is one such modern tool for performing DIV, as demonstrated at the Rokkashomura 
Reprocessing Plant from 2002 to 2006. 
3. Broader use of the 3DLR at the IAEA appears to be limited, for lack of additional 
instruments and inspector training in use of the instrument. (The IAEA possesses only three 
3DLR units of the older original Mark-I design, one of which is permanently resident at the 
RRP Site in Northern Japan. The workshop team estimates that of the approximately 250 
designated inspectors at the IAEA, only about 40 have been trained in the use of this 
instrument, and of those perhaps only 30 remain at the IAEA.) 
4. DOE/NNSA should encourage broader use of the 3DLR by the IAEA, especially in Japan, 
where a resident instrument is pre-positioned. 
5. Other technologies show promise for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
performing DIV. 
6. The Outdoor Verification System (OVS), developed by JRC/Ispra, is a mobile variant of the 
3DLR. It permits the computerized mapping and verification of entire nuclear sites from the 
platform of a Jeep or other vehicle.  The OVS provides detailed three dimensional mapping 
at a very local level that shows trenches, burial grounds, and connective features between 
nuclear facilities on a site. It would address the need for verifying design information at the 
broader site-level. 
7. The OVS shows promise for verifying complete nuclear sites, such as the uranium 
enrichment plant site in Natanz, Iran, and the Yongbyon research reactor and radiochemical 
laboratory site in North Korea. 
8. Researchers at LLNL, LBNL, and ORNL have demonstrated that a gamma camera can be 
combined with the 3DLR to address the need to detect undeclared piping and vessels 
containing gamma emitting nuclear material. This instrument could potentially be further 
developed to detect the presence of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in nuclear facilities. 
9. PNNL has demonstrated enhanced ground penetrating radar (GPR) to visualize buried 
objects in three dimensions, which could address the safeguards need to detect buried or 
concealed process vessels and/or piping during DIV.  
10. LANL, INL, and ORNL have demonstrated virtual reality software tools to address the need 
for portable facility reference models for use during DIV.  Such tools could also be used for 
facility specific pre-inspection briefing and inspection training. 
11. INL has demonstrated CDS for planar images that can be used with scanned images of older 
existing Polaroid photos and other design information to detect changes on a laptop, after 
taking a digital photograph of the current installation. This technology would allow a more 
systematic review by the inspector during DIV, especially where only older reference photos 
are available. 
12. Future developments in support of DIV should consider a heads-up viewer and display that 
would access a portable computer with reference DIV information on demand. The heads-up 
viewer and display would be able to recognize existing features and automatically compare 
against the reference images in the computer. Changes would be noted in the viewer, with 
the highlighting of safeguards relevant changes. 
13. Model responses to the IAEA design information questionnaire (DIQ) have not been revised 
since 1978. DOE previously provided these model DIQ responses through the U.S. Support 
Program to the IAEA to aid others in the proper completion of the DIQ. NNSA should 
consider updating these model DIQ responses, by facility type. 
  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the Workshop on DIE/DIV for Nuclear Safeguards, the Team came to the following conclusions: 
1. The DIE/DIV process as currently conducted by the IAEA offers many opportunities for 
improvement in both efficiency and effectiveness. As emphasized by former IAEA 
inspectors in the workshop, this activity is lacking in automation and relies heavily on 
individual inspector knowledge and experience.  
2. The greatest needs of IAEA inspectors in conducting DIE/DIV are: 
a. Increasing an understanding of the facility design and operation, especially the 
technology in the facility that is safeguards-relevant, 
b. Providing the ability for inspectors to have reference materials on hand during 
inspection, instead of the current practice wherein the reference materials are often 
locked away from the inspection location, 
c. Demonstrating an ability to extract safeguards-relevant data from changes in the 
facility, such that manpower is not wasted on non-relevant facility alterations 
3. Prospective technology or tools in support of DIE/DIV should be judged on the following 
proposed criteria: 
a. Can the technology be used in existing facilities with existing facility attachments?  
b. What is the “Technology Readiness Level” of the technology for deployment?  
c. Does the technology or tool address IAEA DIE/DIV needs? 
d. For which facility type or application is the technology or tool needed? 
e. When is the technology or tool needed? -  i.e., is the need urgent? 
f. What will the technology or tool cost, including equipment purchase, training, and 
maintenance or replacement? 
4. Many of the technologies and tools presented at the workshop on DIE/DIV for safeguards 
would address identified IAEA needs in support of the DIE/DIV.  The Team recommends 
that DOE/NNSA engage in active dialog with the IAEA to confirm their needs in support of 
DIE/DIV, and continue to support the development and demonstration of the tools and 
technology recommended. 
5. Workshop participants saw possibilities for combinations of the presented technology, as 
they are often mutually supportive. The 3DLR can generate the data required for quickly 
creating VR training simulations, including hot spots (gamma-camera) in a facility or 
locating material in an area designated to be cold by the operator. Individual items (such as 
the pipe leading into a hot cell with pure product) can be highlighted as “safeguards 
relevant” in the VR SIM on a laptop carried by the inspector, with each item having an 
intractable folder that shows the picture history of the component for CDS. 
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